Abstract: On 7 May 2014, South Africa held its fifth national and provincial elections since the end of apartheid in 1994. Despite a degree of discontent, the ANC remained firmly in power, receiving 62.15 per cent of the vote. Frustration about non-delivery of services, autocratic tendencies within the ruling party and widespread corrupt practices did not translate into substantially more votes for opposition parties, except in the Western Cape and Gauteng regions (and a swing vote from COPE to DA in Northern Cape). However, voter mobilisation seems to be stagnating and ANC breakaway parties are not faring particularly well. Twenty years after the end of apartheid, popular discontent with the ANC government has expressed itself in voting apathy, particularly among the "born-free" generation. Just as in 2004 and 2009, non-voters remain the largest group in the South African electorate, outnumbering even the ANC.
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• The fifth national and provincial elections after the end of apartheid in South Africa, held on 7 May 2014, were eagerly awaited. 1 After 20 years in power, the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party led by President Jacob Zuma was challenged from a number of directions. The dominant-party state (Southall 2005) was increasingly questioned, both from within and from outside of the ruling party. There was rising discontent among the general public with the government's relatively poor record of service delivery, a perceived failure to provide public goods and an inability to manage inequality. While the ANC-led government after 1994 was successful at increasing access to the health system, providing 3.3 million units of low-cost housing and broadening access to electrification, water supply and sanitation, the country still slid on the Human Development Index (HDI) to 121 st out of 187 countries (2012). This drop was linked to, among other things, the HIV/Aids pandemic (6.2 million people -approximately 12.3 per cent of the population -are still affected) and a related reduction of average life expectancy. 2 Unemployment levels are high: official numbers put the rate of unemployment at 25 per cent, but it has been estimated that as much as 40 per cent of the population is actually excluded from the formal sector. The distribution of life chances remains highly unequal. According to the latest figures, South Africa's GINI coefficient was 63.1 in 2009 and the percentage of the population living under the national Poverty Datum Line (an academic, but in practice non-existent benchmark) was 23 per cent in 2006 (compared to 31 per cent in 1995). In addition, despite huge investments into the educational sector, the quality of South African schools is declining, with a dropout ratio of 55 per cent and a pass rate in many places of only 30-40 per cent. 3 At the same time, little progress has been made with regard to land questions, one of the key issues in the struggle against apartheid. Between 1994 and 2013, only 8 per cent of the land that had been appropriated under colonial and apartheid rule was redistributed (4.1 million ha). Meanwhile, the government's target of 33 per cent redistribution by 2013 has been postponed to 2025 (in general, see Ntsebeza and Hall 2007) . 4 Furthermore, administrative capacities in the former "homelands" seriously lagged behind, but also in the Mpumalanga and Limpopo provinces. In addition to these delivery problems, the ruling party is characterised by infighting, cronyism ("tenderpreneurs"), and increasing levels of corruption that have upset many people (see Lodge 2014; Southall 2013; Zapiro 2013; Wielders 2013) . In public debate, two issues have become symbols of an unfolding crisis of legitimacy and trust. The first is the massacre during a wildcat strike at Marikana mine near Rustenburg, in which 34 striking workers were shot by the police on 16 August 2012 (cf. Alexander 2013; Bond and Mottiar 2013; Botiveau 2014) . 5 The second is the controversy regarding the luxurious publicly funded upgrade of the president's private residence in Nkandla (KwaZulu-Natal) (cf. Public Protector 2014). In this situation the tripartite alliance of the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) showed serious signs of strain, new parties were formed and existing opposition parties expected higher levels of electoral support.
A few examples are provided below:
In the run-up to the national and provincial elections, ANC Party Against this background, the outcome of the fifth national and provincial elections was somewhat sobering (see Table 1 ). The ANC lost some votes but not to the extent expected by many observers, while the opposition gained ground in most of the provinces and some important metropolitan areas, though not as much as they had hoped for. All in all, 33 political parties had registered for the national elections. The ANC maintained a comfortable lead in parliament, short of a twothirds majority. It obtained 62.15 per cent of the vote, compared to 65.90 in the previous elections (which equated to 249 seats, down from 264). According to Faull (2014: 22 (Faull 2014: 25) .
With regard to the larger parties, the final results were fairly close to the last pre-election opinion poll from Ipsos/Sunday Times, which predicted that the ANC would receive 63.9 per cent of the vote (with a downward trend over a number of polls), followed by the DA (23.7 per cent). Support for the EFF and IFP was underestimated (4.7 per cent and 0.8 per cent, respectively), as it was overestimated for COPE (3.4 per cent). 12 In fact, the EFF managed to gain 6. Table 2 ). The rather dramatic news behind this trend is that more and more people in South Africa do not participate in elections at all. The share of eligible voters who participated in the 2014 elections is 59.36 per cent -in the first elections held in April 1994, their share was still 85.53 per cent (see Engel 1994) . In 2004, for the first time, the number of people who had voted in favour of the ANC was lower than the number of non-voters (38.87 per cent vs. 44.23 per cent). In the 2014 national and provincial elections, registration rates were particularly low among the "born-frees"; that is, the generation of 18-19-year-olds who were born after the end of apartheid in 1994. Of an estimated 1.9 million eligible people in this group, just 646,313 registered (approximately 34 per cent). 15 The overall percentages for the ANC would be even lower if the most recent estimate of the voting age population (VAP) was taken into account. According to Faull (2014) 
Observations
Despite popular discontent, the ANC remains firmly in power. For the fifth election in a row, the overwhelming majority of South Africa's registered electorate entrusted the party to govern the country. On 25 May 2014, the new government of President Zuma was sworn in, including a new vice-president in Ramaphosa. Frustration about non-delivery of services, autocratic tendencies within the ruling party and widespread corrupt practices has not translated easily into substantially more votes for opposition parties, except in Western Cape and Gauteng (and a swing vote from COPE to DA in Northern Cape). On the contrary, voter mobilisation seems to be stagnating. ANC breakaways still do not fare well and, 20 years after the end of apartheid, popular discontent with the ANC government is expressed most strongly in not voting at all. Just as in 2004 and 2009, non-voters remain the biggest group of the South African electorate, even outnumbering the ruling ANC.
